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We examined outbreak investigations conducted
around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s Epidemic Intelligence
Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified
causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investi-
gations, intentional use of infectious agents was consid-
ered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks
and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%);
together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks.
Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For
six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contami-
nation was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26
days. We confirmed that the most critical component for
bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the front-
line healthcare professional and the local health depart-
ments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize edu-
cation and support of this frontline as well as methods to
shorten the time between outbreak and reporting.
B
ioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or
toxins derived from living organisms to cause death or
disease in humans, animals, or plants on which we depend.
In 2001, Bacillus anthracis was disseminated through the
U.S. postal system (1). Before that event, concern about
bioterrorism had led to preparedness efforts, including
strategic planning (2). As part of these efforts, we exam-
ined investigations conducted by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Epidemic Intelligence
Service (EIS). EIS was established after World War II, in
part to protect the United States against bioterrorism. We
reviewed characteristics and trends of EIS investigations
conducted from 1988 to 1999 (3). Outbreak investigations
from 1946 to 1987 had already been reviewed (4). We
focused on field investigations involving agents that could
potentially be used for bioterrorism because understanding
how these outbreaks were detected and reported might
improve early detection and reporting of bioterrorism. 
Each EIS field investigation follows an official request
from a state or international health agency. States and
international health agencies receive reports of cases or
outbreaks from many sources, including local public
health agencies, hospitals, healthcare providers, private
citizens, or other federal or international agencies (4). 
We describe lessons learned from outbreak investiga-
tions that involved biologic agents with potential for
bioterrorism. In addition, we review investigations in
which intentional contamination was considered as a
potential cause of the outbreak. 
Methods
Astandardized form was used to collect data from each
investigation from 1988 to 1999. Trip reports submitted by
EIS officers after the investigations served as primary
sources of information. We focused on outbreaks caused
by biologic agents with high potential for bioterrorism,
such as B. anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularen-
sis, variola virus, viral hemorrhagic fever viruses,
Clostridium botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, Rickettsia
rickettsiae, encephalitis viruses, Brucella  species,
Burkholderia mallei and  B. pseudomallei, and others
according to our preparedness plans (2). We also identified
outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamina-
tion was considered. Because each outbreak represented
possible bioterrorism, we examined outbreaks in which the
etiologic agent remained unidentified. From the trip
reports, we abstracted information on possible bioterror-
ism, causative agent, location, time from first case to first
report of the outbreak, and source of recognition and
reporting of the outbreak. 
We defined the source of recognition and reporting as
the person, persons, or institution that originally brought
the outbreak or health emergency to the attention of health
authorities, as recorded in the trip report. While diagnosis
and reporting may be ongoing during an investigation, the
initial recognition of an outbreak is a singular event that
can occur at the peripheral or primary care setting or at the
local, state, or federal level. 
We defined the beginning of the outbreak as onset of
illness in the first case of the outbreak cluster. Diagnosis of
the first illness in an outbreak may occur before the epi-
Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 5, May 2003 515
PERSPECTIVE
Planning against Biological
Terrorism: Lessons from 
Outbreak Investigations 
David A. Ashford,* Robyn M. Kaiser,* Michael E. Bales,* Kathleen Shutt,* Amee Patrawalla,* 
Andre McShan,* Jordan W. Tappero,* Bradley A. Perkins,* and Andrew L. Dannenberg*
*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USAdemic is recognized and is often determined retrospective-
ly. Epi Info 6 software (CDC, Atlanta, GA) was used to
enter the data from the abstractions of the trip reports. SAS
software, release 6.12, (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC) was
used to generate descriptive statistics. 
Results 
Several agents have been identified as likely to be used
in bioterrorism (2). Of the 1,099 investigated outbreaks, 44
(4.0%) were caused by an agent with potential for bioter-
rorism (Table 1). V. cholerae was responsible for 18 out-
breaks,  Y. pestis for 11, viral hemorrhagic fever for 7,
Bacillus anthracis for 3, and C. botulinum toxin for 3. F.
tularensis and R. rickettsiae accounted for one outbreak
investigation each.  The causative agent was not identified
in 41 (3.7%) investigations.
The 44 outbreaks involving an agent with potential for
bioterrorism and the 41 caused by unknown infectious
agents are summarized by location, year, disease agent, and
conclusion (Table 2). All botulism outbreaks (two in the
United States) were linked to contaminated food. Ten of the
11 plague outbreaks occurred in U.S. areas of known
endemic plague in animals. Of the 18 cholera investiga-
tions, 4 were in the United States and involved nursing
home patients, imported food, raw fish, and contaminated
food on an international flight. Twelve (29%) of the 41 out-
breaks caused by unknown agents involved cruise ships. 
Intentional use of infectious agents to cause harm to
civilians (i.e., bioterrorism) was considered in six investi-
gations (Table 3) (5–8). Although the event did not occur
during the period of this review, we included an outbreak
of salmonellosis associated with contamination of a salad
bar in Oregon in 1984. Several years after the investiga-
tion, contamination was (during the study period) deter-
mined to be intentional. 
Healthcare providers were the source of 270 (24.6%)
reports, and infection control practitioners were the source
of 129 (11.7%). Together, these two categories of health-
care professionals were the most common source of out-
break recognition and reporting, accounting for 399
(36.3%) reports. Health departments accounted for 335
(30.5%) reports. Some of these 335 outbreaks may have
been originally reported to local health departments by cli-
nicians or clinical laboratories, but the original reporting
source may have been missing from the trip report. Other
sources of recognition and reporting of these outbreaks
were existing surveillance systems (55, 5.0%), foreign
ministries of health (30, 2.7%), nongovernmental organi-
zations (22, 2.0%), the World Health Organization (16,
1.5%), and the Indian Health Service (12, 1.1%). Forty-
nine (4.5%) outbreaks were reported by other sources,
such as private clinics, laboratories, or private citizens.
More than one reporting source was found in 58 (5.3%)
cases. In 123 (11.2%) outbreaks, no mention was made of
the recognition and reporting source, the method of recog-
nition and reporting was unclear, or both the source and the
method of recognition and reporting were unclear.
The number of days from the beginning of the outbreak
to the date the problem was first identified by the agency
requesting CDC assistance was 0 to 26 days (Table 4). The
time from the date the initial patient became ill to the date
the initial contact was made to the requesting agency for
the unexplained critical illness investigation was 26 days
(Epi-Aid 99-59). The number of days from the date the
problem was identified by the requesting agency to the
date of initial CDC contact was 0 to 6 days.
Discussion
Investigations from 1988 to 1999 included outbreaks
caused by B. anthracis spores, V. cholerae, Y. pestis, F.
tularensis,  Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine
encephalitis virus, viral hemorrhagic fever virus, and
Clostridium botulinum; all of these agents might pose a
bioterrorism threat, were responsible for 4% of all out-
breaks from 1988 to 1999, and are not common causes of
outbreaks investigated by CDC. A single case of illness or
death caused by any of these organisms should suggest
intentional exposure (or accidental exposure in which the
perpetrators inadvertently exposed themselves to the
causative agent.) 
However, not all bioterrorism has involved or will
involve these high-threat (formerly identified as
weaponized) agents. In 1997, a laboratory worker inten-
tionally contaminated his co-workers’food with a strain of
Shigella stolen from the laboratory (9). While the Shigella
strain did cause severe gastroenteritis and several hospital-
izations, the use of this strain deviates from the popular
idea of a bioterrorist’s preferred weapon. However, view-
ing the bioterrorist’s preferred weapon as a high-threat,
aerosolizable, infectious agent that may cause immediate,
widespread outbreaks may mislead preparedness efforts.
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Table 1. Epidemic Intelligence Service field investigations 
involving unknown agents and potential agents of bioterrorism, 
1988–1999 
Agent  Frequency 
% of investigations 
 (n = 1,099) 
Unknown infectious agent
a  41  3.7 
Vibrio cholerae  18  1.6 
Yersinia pestis  11  1.0 
Viral hemorrhagic fever virus  7  0.6 
Bacillus anthracis  3  0.3 
Clostridium botulinum  3  0.3 
Coxiella burnetii  1  0.1 
Francisella tularensis  1  0.1 
Total  85  7.7 
aIn these cases, the outbreak was considered to be caused by an infectious agent 
because of the characteristics of the illness and outbreak. In 1984, the outbreak of salmonellosis associated with
intentional contamination of a salad bar in Oregon was not
initially considered intentional (8); however, further inves-
tigation proved that it was. Intentional contamination may
resemble naturally occurring outbreaks, may spread slow-
ly through a population, and may involve endemic
pathogens. Because of the potential similarity between nat-
urally occurring and intentional outbreaks and the
increased threat of bioterrorism in the United States, the
index of suspicion for intentional exposure should be high.
Despite advances in the identification of pathogens,
outbreaks of unexplained illnesses continue to occur. In
this review, we found 41 outbreaks in which the causative
agent remained undetermined. Intentional contamination
should be considered in these cases because 1) unusual or
not easily explained outbreaks are more likely to be caused
by intentional contamination, 2) outbreaks resulting from
bioengineered pathogens may have unusual or unexpected
characteristics, and 3) bioengineered pathogens may not be
easily detected by existing assays. For these reasons, out-
breaks with unexpected or unusual clinical or epidemio-
logic characteristics should be pursued with added
urgency, and investigators should consider the possibility
of previously unidentified or newly engineered pathogens. 
While CDC is often notified about outbreak investiga-
tions by a state or national health department, the origins
of these reports are diverse and include local health depart-
ments, surveillance systems, physicians, veterinarians,
infection control practitioners, organizations (e.g., the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration or the World Health
Organization), laboratories, private citizens, ship doctors,
vessel sanitation programs, and others. We found that
physicians and infection control practitioners reported
more than one third of outbreaks. This estimate is probably
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Table 2. Trip reports, involving unknown infectious agents or potential agents of bioterrorism (ultimately not considered bioterrorism), 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, January 1988–December 1999 
Report no.  Y  Location  Etiologic/agent  Conclusion 
90-56  1990  Texas, USA  Unknown  Rash and fever in children, no discernable cause 
93-02  1992  Wyoming, USA  Coxiella burnetii  Q fever in two bentonite miners 
94-02  1993  Georgia, USA  Clostridium botulinum  Botulism outbreak linked to contaminated food 
94-32  1994  Five states, USA  Unknown  Cluster of cases, no discernable cause 
94-42  1994  Texas, USA  C. botulinum  Botulism outbreak linked to contaminated food 
94-86  1994  Connecticut, USA  Sabia virus  Accidental infection with Sabia virus in laboratory worker 
94-88  1994  Bolivia  Machupo virus  Bolivian hemorrhagic fever outbreak 
95-16  1994  Utah, USA  Unknown  Contaminated solution used in grafting procedure; 
 source undefined 
95-40  1995  Palau  Dengue type 4 virus  Dengue type 4 virus outbreak 
95-55  1995  Kikwit, Zaire  Ebola virus  Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreak 
95-61  1995  South Dakota, USA  Francisella tularensis  Tick-borne tularemia 
98-23  1998  Kenya; Somalia  Rift Valley fever virus  Rift Valley fever outbreak 
98-28  1998  Argentina  C. botulinum toxin  Botulism outbreak linked to contaminated food 
98-35  1998  Uganda  Rift Valley fever virus  Rift Valley fever virus outbreak 
98-55  1998  Texas, USA  Bacillus anthracis  Exposure to live spore vaccine for anthrax 
98-83  1998  Kazakhstan  B. anthracis  Reemergence of anthrax, Kazakhstan 
11 investigations 
involving plague 
Multiple  10 investigations in USA 
(Oklahoma, Arizona, New 
Mexico, Texas, 
California); one in India. 
Yersinia pestis  Mostly in areas of endemic plague in animals 
18 investigations 
involving cholera 
Multiple  4 investigations in USA 
(Mississippi, Maryland, 
Hawaii, California), 14 
elsewhere 
Vibrio cholerae  Cholera in two nursing home patients, outbreak involving 
imported food, outbreak involving consumption of raw fish, 




agent on cruise 
ships 
Multiple  Cruise ships  Unknown  Gastroenteritis outbreaks in which infectious agent was not 





Multiple  24 in USA, 2 elsewhere  Unknown  Gastroenteritis outbreaks, acute illness after surgical 
procedures, and other outbreaks in which no infectious 
agent was identified by laboratory testing low because the reports that were recorded as originating
from local or state health departments may actually have
been brought to the attention of health departments by
frontline practioners. Because of the importance of this
frontline in detection and reporting, preparedness efforts
must include education and support of these healthcare
professionals. The clinical laboratory should have the
capacity and legal latitude to use all appropriate testing.
This capacity should include Gram stain of tissue smears
for agents such as B. anthracis. 
Trip reports (Epi-2) are summaries, not finalized data
and are written for the state and local health departments
and CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. They are primarily internal documents and are
not independently peer reviewed or standardized; howev-
er, each investigation may use standardized techniques. In
general, problems we encountered were not inaccuracies
(when a subset of trip reports were compared to the articles
that followed them) but rather incompleteness of data we
were interested in reviewing. We suggest that trip reports
include standardized data collection on certain variables
important in evaluating the effectiveness of detecting and
reporting outbreaks (e.g., source of outbreak detection,
date of the first case diagnosis, and date the outbreak was
recognized).  
Because we cannot rely on astute healthcare practition-
ers alone, existing national health surveillance systems
should be modified or strengthened to increase their effec-
tiveness in identifying bioterrorism (10). Systems already
in existence for laboratory-based reporting should be
enhanced for use in bioterrorism surveillance. Improved
surveillance for unexplained critical illness and death may
also be an important component in improved health sur-
veillance for bioterrorism (5). 
In addition to healthcare providers and public health
departments, other persons and organizations may identify
and report outbreaks. For example, veterinarians may be
the first to see evidence of bioterrorism because pets and
livestock may be more susceptible than humans to agents
released in the environment or because a large susceptible
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Table 3. Epidemic Intelligence Service investigations in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was considered a cause 
Report No.  Outbreak  Conclusion 
84-093  Salmonellosis, Oregon, 
1984 
A total of 751 persons became ill with salmonella gastroenteritis. Religious group deliberately 
contaminated salad bars. Salmonella enterica Typhimurium strain found in laboratory at commune 
was indistinguishable from outbreak strain (5). 
97-008   Shigella dysenteriae type 
2, Texas, 1996 
Diarrheal illness in hospital laboratory workers who ate pastries, anonymously placed in break room. 
Identical strains of S. dysenteriae type 2 were isolated from stool cultures of case patients, from 
recovered muffin, and from laboratory stock culture, part of which was missing.  
98-006  S. sonnei, New 
Hampshire, 1997 
Seven laboratory workers at local hospital became ill with gastroenteritis. Most cases caused by strain 
of S. sonnei that was highly related to a stock culture strain maintained by the hospital laboratory. 
Possibility that first two cases were caused by intentional contamination could not be excluded. 
99-025   Anthrax hoaxes, 1998  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of alleged anthrax exposure; letters were 
sent to health clinics in Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee and to private business in Tennessee; three 
telephone threats of anthrax contamination of ventilation systems were made to public and private 
buildings; all threats were hoaxes.  
99-059  Unexplained  
critical illness,  
New Hampshire, 1999 
A 38-year-old woman was admitted to a hospital with fever, myalgia, and weakness; severe illness 
and death occurred 32 days after hospital admission; serum specimens indicated Brucella species. 
Patient’s history of multiple febrile illnesses suggested unspecified autoimmune process. 
99-94-1  Encephalitis cluster,  
New York City, 1999 
Several residents were hospitalized with illness of unknown etiology characterized by fever, 
encephalitis, axonal neuropathy, and flaccid paralysis (unpublished data: Epi-1 report); increase in 
deaths of New York City birds, especially crows; human and bird tissue samples were positive for 
West Nile–like virus. 
Table 4. Number of days from beginning to notification for outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was considered 
Report no.  Investigation 
Beginning of 
outbreak 
No. of days from first case to 
problem identification 
No. of days from problem 
identification to initial CDC contact 
84-93  Large salmonellosis outbreak caused by 
intentional contamination of restaurant salad 
bars, Oregon 
9/15/84  6  4 
97-008  Shigellosis outbreak in hospital laboratory 
workers, Texas 
10/29/96  1  1 
98-006  Shigella sonnei outbreak in laboratory workers, 
New Hampshire 
9/20/97  17  3 
99-25  Anthrax hoaxes  10/30/98  0  0 
99-59  Unexplained critical illness, New Hampshire  3/24/99  26  1 
99-094  Encephalitis cluster with paralysis of unknown 
etiology, New York (West Nile virus) 
8/9/99  14  6 
aCDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. animal population may be present in the affected area (11).
Detection of disease in lower animals may be essential to
detecting a bioterrorism event because most of the bioter-
rorism threat agents are zoonotic disease agents, causing
disease in both humans and lower animals. The West Nile
virus outbreak, while naturally occurring, is a good exam-
ple of the importance of animal disease surveillance
because detection of illness and death in birds was impor-
tant to identification of the outbreak.
Other potential resources include persons not in the
healthcare field. Employers may notice a high rate of ill-
ness in their employees, or schools may report a larger than
usual absentee rate. Enhancing surveillance systems, pro-
viding a mechanism of instant reporting to the proper offi-
cials, educating healthcare professionals and others in the
community, and strengthening knowledge and skills for
thorough outbreak investigations will improve collective
preparedness for bioterrorism. In the future, shortening the
time from detecting to reporting an outbreak to public
health authorities, including CDC, will be essential to an
effective response. National health surveillance systems
are an important adjunct that, with further development,
may allow for early detection of bioterrorism. Finally, edu-
cation about bioterrorism should go beyond a mere
description of the threat agents and strive to enhance the
epidemiologic and investigative skills of healthcare pro-
fessionals, including laboratory personnel, especially those
in primary care settings, who are likely to be the first con-
tact for people and communities affected by acts of bioter-
rorism.
Dr. Ashford is an epidemiologist in the Meningitis and
Special Pathogens Branch, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, where he serves as a subject matter expert for sever-
al zoonotic diseases. His research interests include the epidemi-
ology and control of zoonotic diseases and bioterrorism pre-
paredness.
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